Chinese nationalism during the COVID‐19 pandemic: Conciliatory and confrontational discourses - Wiley

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1 INTRODUCTION

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, nationalism is surging and sweeping across the world. As China has contained the domestic spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, media play a significant role in disseminating the rise of Chinese nationalism. Some international media outlets have claimed that a fever of aggressive nationalism at home has emerged (V. Wang & Qin, 2020). At the same time, discussions on the pandemic on Chinese social platforms are also heated, especially considering the different performance between China and some countries in containing the spread of the virus. Nationalism comes from the feeling of superiority when comparing one's country with other countries (Sinkkonen, 2013). In this regard, such a comparison between China and other countries provides an opportunity to study Chinese nationalism during the pandemic.

The debate about Chinese nationalism has not come to a close. Some researchers engage in the topic from theoretical perspectives, such as labelling and conceptualising the characteristics of Chinese nationalism; some other researchers approach the topic from empirical perspectives, such as studying the contemporary manifestation of Chinese nationalism and conducting surveys. These studies have made a great contribution to understanding Chinese nationalism. However, scholars still have not reached consensus on the nature of Chinese nationalism, which could be attributed to their different research approaches. Given this, I provide an inductive approach by conducting discourse analysis on quotidian nationalist discourses of three macro groups in China, that is, the officials, elites and masses. In this way, I try to analyse what people say about nationalism and what is the broader discursive milieu in which they say it.

By examining the mass discourse (based on 13,518 posts on Zhihu 知乎) and benchmarking it against the official discourse (based on 35 President Xi Jinping's speeches and 134 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's remarks on regular press conference) and the elite discourse (based on 92 and 88 opinion pieces from The People's Daily and Global Times, respectively) between 23 January and 25 July 2020, I find that during the pandemic, Chinese nationalist discourses are not monolithic but multifaceted and that different groups of people have different understandings and expressions of Chinese nationalism. The official discourse is pro-conciliatory, the mass discourse is pro-confrontational and the elite discourse holds a “neutral” position. Different from the prevalent views that regard the Chinese government that frames and leads the development of nationalism, I find that the Chinese masses are the most vociferous advocates of nationalism. These findings suggest that the masses and the Chinese government subscribe to different nationalist frames that run parallel to each other to some extent, and the masses may lead Chinese nationalism from the front during the pandemic. To assess the findings, I first review existing approaches in analysing Chinese nationalism, next I elaborate on the research design then present and analyse the results of discourse analysis, and finally I conclude the analyses and provide implications for future research.

2 EXISTING APPROACHES

Academic interest in contemporary Chinese nationalism began in the early 1990s—the birth period of contemporary Chinese nationalism. The quick survey of existing literature reveals three main approaches in the scholarly analysis of Chinese nationalism (Guo, 2019).

The first approach conceptualises Chinese nationalism as a whole. Researchers have categorised Chinese nationalism based on different types of nationalist sentiments that have been embodied in China. The result is a list of labels, such as “realpolitik,” “reactive,” “confident,” “positive,” “cultural” and “competing,” which is used to describe Chinese nationalism (Shambaugh, 1996; Shambaugh, 2008; S. Zhao, 2014; S. Zhao, 1997; Fewsmith, 2001; Jia, 2005; Oksenberg, 1986). These labels can promote a better understanding of Chinese nationalism by presenting some characteristics of Chinese nationalism. However, most of these labels are the product of specific periods, and scholars could tailor their research to fit these labels (Carlson, 2009). Besides, these labels often treat the Chinese society as a whole rather than further discussing their range of application. In other words, it is hard to know the subject who can apply for these labels. Therefore, labels could only demonstrate several dimensions of Chinese nationalism.

The second approach chooses eye-catching nationalist movements as evidence to study rising Chinese nationalism. The most notable nationalist protests cited by scholars are the 1999 Belgrade Embassy Bombing, the 2001 Hainan Island Incident, the 2005 and 2012 anti-Japanese protests, the 2008 boycott of Carrefour and the 2017 boycott of South Korean goods (Shen & Breslin, 2010; Chan & Bridges, 2006; Gries, 2001; Kim, 2018; Roy, 2019; F. Wang, 1997). The sensational media outlets since the late 1990s, like China Can Say No (中国可以说不), have also been cited as evidence of the rise of alarming Chinese nationalism (Shen, 2007). These studies “focus mainly on the minority of citizens who participate in nationalist demonstrations, rather than on broad trends in popular nationalism per se” (Johnston, 2017:11). Such attention to the “moments of madness” might only reflect the extreme manifestation of Chinese nationalism.

The third approach relies on surveys to extract the nationalist attitudes of Chinese citizens. Results that came from these surveys are based on what respondents said about their nationalist beliefs. Surveys allow researchers to ask specific questions about nationalism, so they can present popular nationalism with more details. However, the approach does not allow respondents to engage one another in discussions, where different political opinions coexist and compete (Zhang et al., 2018). Although open-ended surveys allow respondents to present their opinions without being pigeonholed by the researchers' prior biases (Abdelal et al., 2006), the reality is that the existing studies that use opened-surveys are infrequent. Besides, different scholars used a set of similar questions in their surveys, even though they might have drawn survey questions from different sources (X. Zhao, 2021). In other words, based on responses to these similar survey questions, scholars extrapolate the degree and the distribution of nationalism among Chinese citizens. However, nationalism could evolve with China's development and interactions with the world (Gries, 2001). Therefore, using a nearly unchanging set of indicators may end up measuring attributes that no longer exist while missing out on newly emerging attributes.

Based on the existing approaches and taking into account the possibility of changes, an inductive approach that could capture new characteristics of Chinese nationalism would be a beneficial complement of reflecting changes of Chinese nationalism if there are any. Nationalism is a broad but nuanced phenomenon of a society (Karmazin, 2017). Hughes treats nationalism as a discursive theme rather than as “the expression of a common concept or movement called ‘nationalism’” (Hughes, 2005:248). In this regard, I see nationalism as a social construction and try to recover attributes of Chinese nationalism by deconstructing quotidian discourses during the pandemic.

Discourse permeates all aspects of social life and exposes normative understanding in society (Hansen, 2006). Thus, discourse can reflect what is seeable, sayable, thinkable and doable for all social actors that subscribe to the discourse. Without referring to discourse, it is hard to grasp the “true meaning” of any constructivist account of nationalism (Shapiro, 1981). Even though inconspicuous, nationalist discourses are politically significant. Therefore, focusing on the quotidian nationalist discourses during the pandemic could promote a better understanding of Chinese nationalism of the period.

In addition, discourse analysis has some methodological advantages in studying nationalism. First, there is no initial selection bias. Discourse analysis opposes a priori specification of what nationalism should be present, such a priori specification could lead to the development of research design and thus make researchers elicit the specific nationalism from relevant data (Hopf, 2009). By contrast, discourse analysis involves a large number of texts before researchers know the nature of Chinese nationalism, thus texts cannot be selected for the “desired” results. Second, different from surveys with a fixed set of questions and prior-coded indicators, discourse analysis can collect discursive data from a broader scope. In other words, respondents have more freedom to express themselves. Therefore, scholars may excavate new themes of nationalism. Third, everyday nationalist discourses occur “naturally” among interlocutors, which could avoid the Hawthorne effect and move into the “backstage” of nationalism. Analysing the discourse whispered in private could help to figure out the “real” thoughts of interlocutors (Eliasoph, 1998).

There had been few systemic efforts to deconstruct Chinese nationalism until Hughes applied discourse theory to treat nationalism as a discursive theme. Since Hughes, more scholars have started to pay attention to discourse to study Chinese nationalism. Different from Hughes who studied Chinese novels, Callahan focused on popular texts and deployed a comparative discourse analysis to study the “China Dream” and the “American Dream” (Callahan, 2014; Callahan., 2017). Callahan examined “how national belonging is the product of very active and ongoing political and moral debates among political leaders and public intellectuals” (Callahan., 2017:249), which cannot capture the voice of the masses. Callahan's research represents a genre of researchers who with an eye on Chinese officials' discourses while ignoring the voice of the masses (Lams, 2018; JY. Wang, 2017). Furthermore, some scholars have shifted sights to Chinese cyberspace. By analysing 6,000 tweets from 146 Chinese opinion leaders on Weibo (微博), Zhang et al. explored Chinese nationalism (Zhang et al., 2018). Similarly, by focusing on Zhihu, a Chinese Q&A platform, Zhao and Miao tried to analyse the voice of Chinese netizens (X. Zhao, 2021; Miao, 2020; Guo, 2019). Zhang et al. paid attention to Chinese opinion leaders, while Zhao and Miao focused on the masses. These studies that follow the inductive approach to analyse Chinese nationalism is illuminating. Nevertheless, the discursive milieu in which these nationalist discourses are embedded has been overlooked to some extent. Although some scholars proposed the existence of three macro groups in Chinese nationalism (Aoyama, 2003; Shen, 2007), they did not further compare these groups' nationalist discourses and examine the relationships between these groups. To understand these discourses fully, it is necessary to evaluate them against the broader discursive environment (Hopf, 2009).

3 RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Text selection

Chinese nationalism is not monopolised by any one class or stance. Whether the government, intellectuals or ordinary people, they have inevitably participated in this game and tried to influence China's internal affairs, society, culture and diplomacy through this platform (Lai, 2013:71). Just as the existing studies have acknowledged that Chinese nationalism is not a homogenous phenomenon. However, the differences within Chinese society are still understudied. Thus, the very fact of an official-elite-mass split on nationalism matters, if we are concerned with whether there is a common understanding of nationalism shared by a whole society and if we would like to know the differences, similarities and connections of different social groups' nationalism within a country (Hopf, 2016). In other words, the official-elite-mass split allows us to distinguish between those nationalist sentiments held by the officials and elites versus those reflected among the masses (Allan et al., 2018). Such an argument is not unique but has its counterpart. Aoyama pointed out that Chinese nationalism can be presented at three levels, that is, the government, elite intellectuals who guide public opinion and the general masses (Aoyama, 2003:297). Similarly, Shen argued that based on “their functional position in shaping modern Chinese nationalism”, it is reasonable to identify three macro Chinese groups, that is, the “top” party-state, the “bottom” ordinary citizens and the “intermediary” social elites (Shen, 2007:12–13).

These three groups consist of different entities. The officials include the top leaders and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the social elites refer to intellectuals, the international relations scholars and journalists, and the masses appear in the virtual community and polls and reports in the mass media (Shen, 2007:13). These three groups play different roles in the revival and construction of Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism emerged at the "top" to address its ideological vacuum in the early 1990s by using patriotic and moral terms (Chang, 2001; Shen, 2007). With the reintroduction of nationalism by the government, social elites accelerate the spread of nationalism in China through opening debates and guiding public opinion (Shen, 2007; Zhang et al., 2018), while the masses are related to the rapid popularisation of nationalism within the Chinese society after the emergence of nationalist publications (Shen, 2007:15; Yee, 2004:72). Comparatively speaking, the “top” is the beginner and leader in the revival and development of Chinese nationalism who manoeuvers nationalism into a political movement (Xu, 1998); the “intermediary” is the producer as well as the propagator of nationalism by using their influence and resources, and the “bottom” is more like a disseminator and consumer who provides the soil for nationalist sentiments (Jun. Wang, 2006:5).

Although there are some overlaps between these three groups in China, three reasons remind us to separate the elites from the other two groups in addition to the aforementioned different functions. First, the elites are a force to be reckoned with in the construction of Chinese nationalism. Anderson argued that social elites often guide the emergence of nationalism (Anderson, 1983). Chinese social elites' opinions are cited, spread or debated. Their comments directly influence the masses and thus become a great source of nationalist expertise or related arguments for mass nationalists. For instance, the elite discourse has been accepted by the masses and plays a lasting role in the construction of anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese people (Y. He, 2007:3). Second, the elites provide a “two-way link” between the government and the masses. Towards the “top”, they convey and conceptualise popular thinking and/or provide policy advice; towards the “bottom”, they transmit official policy featuring added opinions to the “bottom” (Shen, 2007:13–14). Third, between the “top” and the “bottom,” the elites play a great role due to their features. Compared with the officials, they could barely set and lead the dominant tone and direction of Chinese nationalism, but they can interpret international and domestic issues and obscure officials statements to increase influence; compared with the masses, they have relatively more influence and resources in guiding the development of Chinese nationalism. Given this, the elite would encounter some difficulties but enjoy some advantages in the construction of Chinese nationalism. Considering these, to distinguish the officials, elites, and masses, and to examine these three groups' nationalist sentiments independently is necessary and meaningful.

Drawing on the aforementioned trichotomy, I focus on discursive materials of Chinese officials, elites, and masses between January 23 and July 25, 2020. The official discursive materials refer to President Xi's speeches and Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's remarks on regular press conference.

The elite discourse includes opinion pieces of The People's Daily and Global Times. Newspaper plays a significant role in the formation and rise of nationalism (Anderson, 1983:15). In the age of Internet, these two newspapers are among the most read on mobile devices and dominated the top two positions in China (People's Daily, 2016). A representative text is the most read one by the mass public. The number of subscriptions, viewership, and listenership should be brought into consideration when selecting texts (Hopf, 2009:285). As a leading mouthpiece of the party-state and a top-selling commercial newspaper in China, The People's Daily and Global Times serve as a crucial bridge between leadership narratives and popular discourses. Therefore, these two newspapers are suitable for the research, which aims at uncovering the interactions and comparisons between these three macro groups at a national scale. The selected opinion pieces include Editorial, Viewpoint, Top Talk and Special Column. These opinion pieces are written by editors, journalists, intellectuals, scholars and subject-matter experts.

The mass discourse was chosen from Zhihu posts. Zhihu is a Q&A social media platform in China. Zhihu users can engage in discussions with one another in questions that they are interested in, thus they can express their viewpoints without being restricted by a set of pre-set options. In this regard, new attributes and changes of Chinese nationalism might emerge from these quotidian discourses. Considering the massive user base and the absence of 50-Cent Party (五毛党) (King, Pan & Roberts 2017), scholars have treated posts on Zhihu as representativeness of mass discourses (X. Zhao, 2021; Miao, 2020; Guo, 2019). These three discursive materials represent the “top-intermediary-bottom” macro groups in China and thus can reflect nationalism in China to a significant extent.

3.2 Sampling strategies

I deployed different sampling strategies for different discursive materials. As for the official discourse, I selected all of these discursive materials between January 23, 2020 (the day China imposed a lockdown in Hubei) and July 25, 2020. These materials were taken from “Xi Jinping Series Important Speech Database” (习近平系列重要讲话数据库) and the official website of Foreign Ministry of China. In total, I selected 35 President Xi's speeches and 134 spokesperson's remarks during the period.

For the elite discourse, I selected all opinion pieces from the online archive of The People's Daily and Global Times on the 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th, and 30th of each month between January 23 and July 25, 2020. Such a sampling strategy can read across genres. In other words, I can eliminate the potential effect of periodic topics on selecting and analysing discursive materials. In sum, I selected 92 and 88 opinion pieces from The People's Daily and Global Times, respectively.

For the mass discourse, I used “coronavirus” (新冠), “pandemic” (疫情), and “COVID-19” (新冠肺炎) as search terms to locate Zhihu questions that relate to my research purpose. In the end, I obtained 272 questions. Then, I chose four questions from the 272 questions according to their diversity and quantity (Hopf, 2009; Guo, 2019). As for the diversity, I classified the questions into four groups according to salient themes: (1) China's performance; (2) others' performance; (3) external provocation; and (4) the future of China and the world. Then I selected four questions from these four themes respectively based on quantity. Quantity refers to the number of users who follow the questions, the number of times the questions have been viewed and been answered, which reflect popularity. Finally, I chose the below questions corresponding to the above-mentioned themes.

1. How do you view China's substantial assistance to numerous countries during the COVID-19 pandemic? (如何看待中国在新冠疫情中密集出手援助多国?), which had 2,319 posts.¹
2. Why do foreign countries not fully learn from China's experience in COVID-19 prevention and control? (为什么国外不充分借鉴中国新冠肺炎防治的经验?), which had 3,906 posts.²
3. How do you view various countries' claims against China for the COVID-19 pandemic? (如何看待各国对本次新冠肺炎疫情向中国索赔?), which had 2,820 posts.³
4. Will the COVID-19 pandemic turn China's international reputation and public opinion around? (新冠肺炎疫情会不会成为中国国际口碑和舆论的翻身仗?), which had 4,473 posts.⁴

3.3 Coding

Coding is to record paragraphs in the selected discursive materials. In this article, codes were generated deductively (based on conceptual attributes mentioned in the existing research) and inductively (allowing themes to emerge from discursive materials). I coded all selected discursive materials with NVivo and gained 10,402 references under 160 nodes. Then I classified the 160 nodes under five thematic heading: “Aspirations of Chinese nationalism” (13 nodes and 1,415 references), “Roots of Chinese nationalism” (5 nodes and 579 references), “Perception of China” (22 nodes and 2,339 references), “Perception of others” (24 nodes and 3,500 references), and “Significant others” (96 nodes and 2,569 references).⁵ Table 1 presents an overview of these codes organised under the thematic headings. My colleague randomly conducted an inter-coder reliability test on 30 official texts, 60 elite texts, and 170 Zhihu posts. The weighted kappa value is 0.81, which meets the widely accepted requirement of 0.75.

TABLE 1. Overview of codes

Aspirations of Chinese nationalism	Roots of Chinese nationalism
1. Follow existing approaches 2. Improvement of international status 3. Interdependent “+” 4. Maintain the development 5. Make China's voice heard “−” 6. Make friends “+” 7. National rejuvenation 8. Political stability and unity 9. Realist gain “−” 10. Remain modest “+” 11. Self-determination and national unity “−” 12. Stand firm “−” 13. World leadership “−”	1. External provocation “−” 2. Glorious history 3. Leadership of government or CCP 4. Painful history 5. Significant achievements
Perception of China	Perception of others
1. Big-hearted “+” 2. Civilised 3. Confident “−” 4. Dauntless 5. Doormat 6. Fair-minded “+” 7. Grateful “+” 8. Long-sighted 9. Muffed 10. No voice “−” 11. Overoptimistic 12. Patriotic 13. Patriotic worrying “−” 14. People-oriented 15. Peaceful “+” 16. Pragmatic 17. Resilient 18. Speech controlling 19. Unique and superior “−” 20. Unpatriotic 21. Us against them “−” 22. Victim	1. Adversarial “−” 2. Arrogant “−” 3. Bandwagoning 4. Benchmark and competitor “−” 5. Biassed “−” 6. Brainwashed 7. Deplorable 8. Friends “+” 9. Hegemonic “−” 10. Ineffectual “−” 11. Interest-oriented 12. Little brother or student 13. Paper tiger 14. Praiseworthy “+” 15. Publicity stunt 16. Respectful “+” 17. Self-serving 18. Sharing common destiny “+” 19. Strategic partner “+” 20. Targeting China “−” 21. Tarring “−” 22. Uncivilised 23. Untrustworthy “−” 24. Unworthy of attention

3.4 Analysing

With the assistance of NVivo, I identified the co-occurrence of the codes to connect the salient themes. By creating cross-tabulations between different groups, I traced the connections. For instance, in Table 2, in the official discourses, the high frequencies of co-occurrence between “External provocation” (47.61%) and “Stand firm” (5.91%, 15 times) indicate that the Chinese officials express a tough stance facing external provocation.⁷ Then I can map the dominant nationalist discourse in the three discourses based on the salient themes and relationships identified by the cross-tabulations. These figures are presented in the following sections.

TABLE 2. Cross-tabulation in the official discourse

	A: External provocation	B: Glorious history	C: Leadership of CCP or government	D: Painful history	E: Significant achievements
1: Follow existing approaches	0	6	3	0	3
2: Improvement of international status	0	0	0	0	0
3: Interdependent	0	0	0	1	0
4: Maintain the development	0	0	0	0	0
5: Make Chinas voice heard	0	0	0	0	0
6: Make friends	0	0	0	0	0
7: National rejuvenation	0	2	1	0	1
8: Political stability and unity	0	1	2	0	2
9: Realist gain	0	0	0	0	0
10: Remain modest	0	0	0	0	0
11: Self-determination and national unity	6	0	0	0	0
12: Stand firm	15	0	0	0	0
13: World leadership	0	0	1	0	0

The next is to explore how does the mass discourse relate to the wider discursive context. Based on the coding scheme, I examined the connections between the three discourses via a two-pronged approach. Quantitatively, I conducted a correlation analysis to assess the degree of correlation between them. Qualitatively, based on the tone and sentiment of the nodes, I grouped some nodes that highlight the relationships between China and others into two sets of “conciliatory” and “confrontational”. Recalling Table 1, the “-” and “+” behind the nodes represent two sets of codes. The “-” represents the confrontational set of nodes and the “+” refers to the conciliatory set of nodes. Comparing the total frequencies of occurrence of the nodes under each set can assess the tone and nature of the three discourses, that is: more confrontational or more conciliatory (Guo, 2019). This step can figure out the correlations between the three discourses.

4 QUOTIDIAN DISCOURSES OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

4.1 Official discourse

The most salient aspiration of Chinese nationalism in the official discourse is interdependent (47.03%). During the pandemic, the Chinese government advocates strengthening international cooperation to fight against the virus and create the human community with a shared future (i.e. interdependent). On the one hand, they stress that the pandemic is people's common enemy, countries should carry out international joint prevention and control and share information to develop the vaccine (Xi, 2020a; L. Zhao, 2020a). On the other hand, they support the leadership of international organisations, such as the WHO and G20 (Geng, 2020a, 2020b; Xi, 2020a). As shown in Figure 1, interdependent is strongly associated with the perception of others as sharing a common destiny (11.2%), strategic partners (4.8%), and friends (10.83%). In other words, the aspiration of being interdependent often appears with these three perceptions of others in the official discourse. Furthermore, ASEAN (1.39%) and Africa (4.15%) have been usually perceived as sharing a common destiny and friend, respectively.

Connections in the official discourse¹⁰ [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Big-hearted (48.39%) and people-oriented (21.84%) are the most salient nodes in the perception of China in the official discourse. The official discourse emphasises that China is fighting an all-out war against COVID-19 not just for its own sake, but also for global public health security. On the one hand, China puts people's life and health as its top priority and can effectively protect the basic needs of the people (i.e., people-oriented) (Hua, 2020a, 2020b; Xi, 2020b). The elderly, low-income family, medical staff, and overseas Chinese (2.58%) have been frequently mentioned in the official discourse. Besides, China sets much store on the safety and health of foreign nationals in China and treats infected foreign nationals in China the same as Chinese citizens (L. Zhao, 2020e). On the other hand, the officials stress the openness, transparency, and responsibility of China in fighting against the pandemic, sharing the genome sequence and control and treatment experience with the world in a timely fashion, and assisting countries in need within China's capacity (Hua, 2020b, 2020d). In short, the official discourse depicts China as a responsible power that thinks big (i.e., big-hearted), and has won high acclaim from the international community (i.e., respectful, 12.87%).

The salient root of Chinese nationalism is external provocation (47.61%),⁹ which often appears in conjunction with the perception of others of tarring (11.32%), targeting China (5.25%), hegemonic (15.49%), and deplorable (5.15%), and the aspiration of stand firm (5.91%). In the official discourse, external provocation mainly refers to insults from the Wall Street Journal (i.e., deplorable) (Hua, 2020c), India's invasion of southern Tibet (i.e., hegemonic) (Geng, 2020b), Australia's double-standards in treating China and the US (i.e., hegemonic) (L. Zhao, 2020c), the US interferes in China's internal affairs (i.e., hegemonic) (L. Zhao, 2020d), US politicians' stigmatisation of China (i.e., tarring) (Geng, 2020d), US oppression against Huawei and Chinese media outlets in the US (i.e., targeting China) (Geng, 2020a, 2020d). There is growing frustration in the Chinese government at these external behaviours, which threatens China's economic development, national security, and international reputation. Except for the stigmatisation of China, other external provocations have violated the core interests of China that were identified in China's white paper “China's Peaceful Development” in 2011. Therefore, during the pandemic, the Chinese government pays high attention to China's international reputation when facing others' attempts of blame-shifting and stigmatisation of China. In response to these external provocations, the officials warn that “China would not remain silent but will respond with firm countermeasures every step of the way” (中方不会忍气吞声, 必将坚决反制, 奉陪到底) (i.e., stand firm) (Geng, 2020d).

Lastly, the US (42.53%) and the WHO (4.49%) are significant others that have high connections with other nodes. In the official discourse, the US is perceived as targeting China, hegemonic, deplorable, tarring, untrustworthy (4.44%), and biassed (3.57%). The last two perceptions refer to America's attempts to pay lip-service to assist China to fight against the pandemic, and viewing China via tainted glasses, respectively. By contrast, the WHO has a better image and is normally regarded as praiseworthy (6.89%). Due to its efforts to coordinate response and cooperation worldwide since the outbreak of COVID-19, the WHO is highly commended in the official discourse (L. Zhao, 2020b).

4.2 Elite discourse

Similar to the official discourse, the elite discourse also emphasises interdependent (21.43%) as a nationalist aspiration. In the elite discourse, interdependent is also strongly connected with the perception of China as big-hearted (21.23%) and the perception of others as sharing a common destiny (20.82%). The difference is that the object that shares a common destiny is not ASEAN (0%) but Italy (4.15%). Together with France (0.98%) and the WHO (2.92%), Italy recognises China's efforts against the pandemic (i.e., respectful, 7.92%) (Li & Kang, 2020; Zhang, 2020a; Zhang, 2020c). Besides, another salient nationalist aspiration in the elite discourse, maintain the development (24.77%) conveys an urgency of work resumption and solving some problems that have been exposed during the national crisis such as disease control and prevention, medical insurance, material logistics and bureaucracy (Global Times, 2020b; People's Daily, 2020; Q. Wang, 2020; Wu & Hou, 2020). Solving these problems can maintain the development of China as well as make life better for people, thus the aspiration connects with the perception of China as people-oriented (17.18%). (Figure 2)

Connections in the elite discourse [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

Different from the official discourse, the most salient nationalist root in the elite discourse is not external provocation (11.39%) but refers to significant achievements (38.83%) and leadership of CCP or government (34.76%). Significant achievements refer to the rise of China in the past decades in economic, military and technological development and China's inspiring performance in fighting against the pandemic (Lei, 2020; Yu, 2020; Zhang, 2020b). Also, significant achievements are often associated with the perception of China as confident (9.28%) and unique and superior (16.13%). Such significant achievements make Chinese people confident in the capability of China and the path of development. Therefore, the perception of confident often appears with the aspiration of follow existing approaches (6.32%) in the elite discourse (Global Times, 2020a; Yang, 2020). Besides, the past success convinces the elites that China has a unique and advantageous political system and outperforms other countries before and during the pandemic (L. He, 2020). The latter nationalist root, leadership of CCP or government, highlights the crucial role of CCP and the Chinese government in resisting foreign aggression in history and leading the development in recent decades. Considering the memory of war as well as the feature of the party-state, this nationalist root is usually associated with the perception of China as unique and superior and dauntless (13.14%). A typical discourse of dauntless is as follows: all in order to defeat the pandemic, not afraid of difficulties; in order to overcome all difficulties, dedication without bitterness (一切为了战胜疫情, 冲锋不畏难；为了克服一切困难, 奉献不言苦) (Li, 2020).

Similar to the official discourse, the most significant other in the elite discourse is the US (53.91%). The perceptions of the United States include targeting China (8.76%), hegemonic (7.2%), deplorable (6.79%), tarring (5.32%), biassed (3.35%), untrustworthy (7.03%), ineffectual (8.96%), arrogant (2.89%), paper tiger (4.63%) and self-serving (2.83%). The last four are new perceptions in the elite discourse. Specifically, the perception of the United States as ineffectual indicates that the United States is ineffective in dealing with the virus. The count of death and infection, the scorn the United States has for the virus and the lack of preparation usually appear in elite discourses (Le, 2020). In the same way, European countries (3%) are also regarded as ineffectual. As for the perception of arrogant, the United States often comments on other countries with its head in the air, and the United States still live in the past (Cao, 2020). In the elite discourse, the United States is self-referential and neither recognises the achievements of others nor treats others as equal (Global Times, 2020d). Moreover, the perception paper tiger refers to the US means that direct at China were ineffectual, such as squashing Huawei and pass the buck to China (Global Times, 2020g). More importantly, the United States is in the crisis of the pandemic; the prospects of its economy and social order are hardly optimistic (Global Times, 2020e). Furthermore, a self-serving perception of the United States is embodied at the international and domestic levels. As for the international level, the notion “America First” has been strictly enforced. The United States adopts unilateralism to deal with the virus and disrupt flights with other countries; such behaviours have undermined international cooperation (Cao, 2020). At the domestic level, some US politicians consider their own political interests more, like campaigning for re-election, and do not put fighting the pandemic as their top priority (Global Times, 2020c).

Another two significant others worth discussing, Taiwan (6.07%) and Japan (4.41%). The reunification of Taiwan has always been an aspiration for mainland China (i.e., Self-determination and national unity, 6.12%). For the elites, Taiwan is regarded as a paper tiger due to its weak capability as well as its “spineless” obedience to the US orders (Global Times, 2020f). As for self-serving, the Taiwan authorities accelerate Taiwan into a powder keg between China and the United States for their own political interests but also undermine international cooperation by attacking the WHO and challenging the principle of One China. By contrast, the elites often refer to Japan as praiseworthy (4.22%). Such praise comes from Japan's support to China in the early stage of against the virus (Da, 2020). (Figure 3)

Connections in the mass discourse [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

4.3 Mass discourse

Different from the official and elite discourses, stand firm (26.45%), make China's voice heard (16.29%), world leadership (10.46%) and maintain the development (18.07%) are the salient aspirations in the mass discourse. For the masses, the aspiration of standing firm comes from external provocation (18.43%), patriotic worrying (7.04%) and confident (8.34%). Specifically, external provocations, such as potential anti-China coalitions and claim damages from China, lead the masses to feel insecure and fear of invasion, thus the masses maintain vigilance to potential risks. “Cast all illusions and go into the battle” (抛弃幻想, 准备斗争) is a popular discourse circulated among the masses (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c). Also, the tough stance demonstrates that the masses have faith in China's capability in dealing with these external provocations. Moreover, the main objects of vigilance include the United States (27.86%) and the West (19.35%).

Besides, winning the consensus warfare at the international level is a heated topic in the mass discourse (i.e., make China's voice heard). The masses believe that the strength and ability of China's global communication do not commensurate with its national strength. Therefore, China has no strength and means to give responses (i.e., no voice, 9.81%) when facing others' stigmatisation (i.e., tarring, 14.13%). Moreover, some masses think that China's publicity in international public opinion has not been able to keep pace with its external aids during the pandemic. As a result, they lament that China is being a yesman (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d).

For the masses, China could fill the role of world leader. Such an aspiration often appears with two roots of nationalism: significant achievements (32.32%) and glorious history (15.96%). The former stresses the great achievements China has scored over the past decades and during the pandemic, which inspires the masses' confidence (i.e. confident, 8.34%), patriotism (i.e. patriotic, 4.76%) and the sense that China is unique and superior (9.14%). As a result, some masses view others as paper tiger (5.18%), especially considering some countries' performance in dealing with the virus. As for the latter nationalist root, glorious history emphasises China's long history and former glory. In this regard, the masses are proud of the past greatness and aspire to restore the past glory (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d). Thus, glorious history often co-occurs with the nationalist aspiration of follow existing approaches (1.2%), which not only highlight the aspiration of inheriting and carrying forward the fine traditions of the Chinese nation but also instil the masses that China is on the path to national rejuvenation and the rise to prominence (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020b, 2020d).

In terms of the last salient nationalist aspiration, for some masses, external provocations in the pandemic would not pose a substantial threat to China; thus, they are unworthy of attention (3.89%) and China only needs to focus on maintaining development (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020d).

Different from the official and elite discourses, painful history (20.46%) is a salient nationalist root in the mass discourse. It conveys the Century of Humiliation and the difficult years of China of being backward since 1949. This nationalist root often co-occurs with the United States (27.86%), Italy (7.36%), the UK (6.91%), Japan (5.98%), Germany (3.16%) and France (2.13%). These countries invaded China in the past. Faced with provocations from them, the masses ask rhetorically whether these countries want to form a contemporary “Allied Forces of Eight Powers” (八国联军) and invade China again (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d). Besides, the perception of Germany, the United States and the EU as self-serving reflects the divisiveness among the West. For instance, Italy's call for urgent help was ignored by the EU and the US seized masks destined to Germany and France.

During the pandemic, China sent aid to Italy to deal with the pandemic. For the Chinese masses, such assistance demonstrates a big-hearted (5.62%) perception of China. Besides, the masses frequently quote Italy's appreciation for China (i.e., respectful, 1.96%). Also, the masses praise the performance of South Korea and Japan (i.e. praiseworthy, 2.46%) during the pandemic. Except for these two countries' assistance to China in the early stage, the praise comes from their good performance in containing the domestic spread of the pandemic. In return, China has sent medical supplies to support Japan and South Korea when they are in need. Therefore, in the mass discourse, China is perceived as grateful (2.68%) (Zhihu, 2020a, 2020b, 2020c, 2020d). In general, the Chinese masses often consider Italy, Japan and South Korea as friends (2.04%). Furthermore, similar to the official and elite discourses, in the mass discourse, the United States is also the most salient others and shares similar perceptions, including tarring (14.13%), targeting China (8.89%), arrogant (8.61%), ineffectual (6.53%), hegemonic (5.81%), paper tiger (5.18%) and self-serving (3.33%).

5 BRIEF SUMMARY

According to previous analyses, there are some similarities and differences in the tone and content between the three discourses during the pandemic. First, compared with other discourses, the mass discourse is more ambitious and tougher. In the mass discourse, ambitious and tough nationalist aspirations, such as stand firm, world leadership and make China's voice heard, account for 53.2% of aspirations of Chinese nationalism. By contrast, the proportion of these aspirations in the official and elite discourses is 6.91% and 14.38%, respectively. Both the official and elite discourses emphasise a more cooperative and cautious attitude towards the outside world. The finding is relatively counterintuitive, because the Chinese masses are the most vociferous advocates of nationalism, as opposed to the prevalent view that it is the CCP leadership that frames public opinion on such issues (S. Zhao, 1998; Z. Wang, 2012).

Second, the officials describe China as big-hearted and people-oriented, which accounts for 70.23% of the perception of China. Although the elites also convey the perceptions, the proportion of these perceptions in the elite and mass discourses are 38.41% and 7.75%, respectively. It shows that the effect of self-advertisement of the Chinese government within the country is not obvious to some extent. Such a finding is contrary to the viewpoint that Chinese nationalism is a result of a state-led nationalist campaign (S. Zhao, 1998). To evaluate the effectiveness of top-down nationalist, propaganda deserves further investigation.

Third, the mass discourse is more radical and bluntly in criticising China's performance during the pandemic. The derogatory perceptions of China, like no voice (9.81%), overoptimistic (4.09%), speech controlling (3.01%), doormat (2.46%) and muffed (2.4%), only appear in mass discourses. The finding matches the existing research, that is, censorship in China allows the masses to criticise the government (King et al., 2017).

Fourth, contrasting past misery with present happiness is a main source of the nationalist sentiments in the three discourses, with the elite discourse sharing more in common with both the official and mass discourses than these two latter discourses have with each other. Specifically, the total percentage of significant achievements and painful history reach 52.78% in the mass discourse, while the officials consider more on external provocation (47.61%) and the leadership of CCP and government (21.66%), and the elites underline the leadership of CCP and government (34.76%) and significant achievements (38.83%). The elite discourse bridges the official and mass discourses by highlighting the common ground between these two. The finding is consistent with most of the existing research in two ways; that is, the roots of Chinese nationalism mainly are historical factors and the upgrade of national strength (Y. He, 2007; Z. Wang, 2008) and the bridge role of social elites in the whole society (Shen, 2007).

6 DISCURSIVE MILIEU

Previous findings provide a picture of what people say about nationalism; the next step is to explore the connection between these three discourses. To achieve the goal, I used both quantitative and qualitative approaches. In Table 3, the Pearson correlation coefficient is the highest between official and elite discourses, with a coefficient of 0.756. The correlation coefficient is relatively high between elite and mass discourses, with a coefficient of 0.662. Lastly, the correlation coefficient is weak between the official and mass discourses, with a coefficient of 0.362. All of these correlations are statistically significant. The high correlation between the elite discourse and the other two discourses matches with the current understanding of the bridge role of Chinese media across the state-society divide (Tai, 2014; Guo, 2019). However, the weak correlation between the official and mass discourses is unexpected to some extent, since some scholars claim that the Chinese government is good at exploiting crises and sets the public agenda (Liu & Chan, 2018). The weak correlation suggests that the Chinese government and the masses have different nationalist understandings and expressions during the pandemic. For example, although the officials repeatedly advocate strengthening international cooperation, only a few of masses express such an idea. Similarly, when talking about China's foreign aids during the pandemic, the officials highlight China's big-hearted image, while the masses consider more from a pragmatic perspective and regard that economic and reputational gains are the main motivations. Thus masses' nationalist views are not a product of top-down propaganda to some extent. As Johnston stated “there was no offcial campaign at the grassroots levels” (Johnston, 2017:38).

TABLE 3. Correlations across discourses

	Official discourses	Elite discourses	Mass discourses
Official discourses	\	0.756**	0.362**
Elite discourses		\	0.662**
Mass discourses			\

To assess the quantitative results and explore the nature of the three discourses, I compared them qualitatively as aforesaid. Table 4 shows that the official discourse is pro-conciliatory, the elite discourse is relatively “neutral,” while the mass discourse is pro-confrontational. Specifically, in the official discourse, the amount of conciliatory nodes is 721, which accounts for 60.5% of the “sentimental” nodes. The result is in line with Johnston's finding that under President Xi, the frequency of using hostile terms is relatively low, even when compared with the Hu Jintao regime (Johnston, 2017:39). By contrast, the proportion of conciliatory nodes in the mass discourse is only 22.2%, indicating that the mass discourse is overwhelmingly confrontational. Such a result is contrary to the claim that CCP is more anti-foreign and Chinese youth are less nationalist and confrontational (Johnston, 2017).

TABLE 4. Comparison across discourses

Nodes	Official discourses	Elite discourses	Mass discourses
Confrontational	471 (39.5%)	331 (51.7%)	2,336 (77.8%)
Conciliatory	721 (60.5%)	309 (48.3%)	665 (22.2%)
Total	1,192 (100%)	640 (100%)	3,001 (100%)

The qualitative result matches the result of the above correlation analysis. The elite discourse holds the intermediary position, thus having higher correlations with the other discourses. Also, the weak correlation between the official and mass discourses is reflected in the divergent nature of pro-conciliatory and pro-confrontational. Put differently, in the pandemic, the officials, elites and masses have expressed various nationalisms in their expressions.

Recontextualising these findings would further explain the confrontational and conciliatory natures of the three discourses. The officials emphasise more the strengthening international cooperation to fight against the virus, such as stressing “interdependent,” “make friends” and portraying China as a kind and responsible power. On many occasions, they have stated that COVID-19 is a common challenge facing mankind and requires a concerted response from the international community (Xi, 2020b; L. Zhao, 2020d; Geng, 2020c). Also, the officials often speak of China's image as a responsible great power (负责任大国) and “big-hearted,” in assisting others in fighting against the pandemic or participating in the reform and development of the global governance system. Such a tone meets the features of “positive nationalism,” which stresses China's international-oriented strategy, like striving for international cooperation and contributing to the general welfare of the world (Chen, 2005). Johnston summarised that the great revival of the Chinese nation requires a conciliatory attitude from China's leadership when they deal with the world (Johnston, 2017:38).

By contrast, the masses are more confident, showing confrontational and vigilant sentiments in quotidian discourses. The masses discuss China's performance in fighting against the pandemic and the smearing of China from others and buck passing of China by others. For instance, some netizens argue that “it is worth cautioning against China on trumped-up charges, even the possibility of war.” (值得警惕的是, 用莫须有的罪名来制裁中国, 甚至发动战争的可能。) (Zhihu, 2020b). Faced with the situation, the masses have faith in the capability of China and claim that “(we) were not afraid of you in the '50s, let alone now.” (五十年代都没怕过你们, 更别说现在了。) (Zhihu, 2020c). In short, the masses show a confrontational and xenophobic posture in their discourses during the pandemic (X. Zhao, 2021:277).

While the elite discourse falls in between the two ends of the spectrum. The elites stand for strengthening international cooperation and sharing a common destiny with others. For example, authors in The People's Daily and Global Times repeatedly emphasise that in the face of COVID-19, mankind is a community with a shared future and we need to join hands to win this war (Global Times, 2020h; Zhao, 2020c). On the other hand, they criticise others' offence and inefficiency in no uncertain terms. For instance, Zhu Feng, professor of Nanjing University, directly points out that the level of attention and policy preparedness for the pandemic in some countries is woefully inadequate, but even so, some foreign senior officials continue to poke fun and attack China without principle (Zhu, 2020).

By situating the mass discourse in the broader discursive context and benchmarking it against the official and elite discourses, I find that there is only a weak quantitative correlation between the official and mass discourses. Also, the two discourses differ qualitatively. The findings reject the claims that the Chinese government is guiding or restricted by Chinese nationalism (Weiss, 2013) and the idea that takes Chinese nationalism as a homogenous concept for granted across all Chinese classes (Kim 2011; Cong, 2009).

7 CONCLUSION

During the pandemic, various circles in China have discussed China's and others' performance in fighting against the pandemic. The nationwide discussion provides a chance to understand what Chinese people say about nationalism and the broader discursive environment in which the nationalist discourses are embedded. This article tries to inductively explore Chinese nationalism by coding, analysing, and comparing Chinese official, elite and mass discourses.

This article has three main findings. The first is the heterogeneity of Chinese nationalism. The mass discourse is stronger and more radical when faced with external provocation. Such a tough stance mainly draws strength from China's significant achievements in past decades and the painful history of being invaded and backward. By contrast, the official discourse shows a gesture of cooperation. Under the global crisis, the Chinese government advocates strengthening international cooperation and the responsible image of China. Nevertheless, critical voices still only exist in the mass discourse. Different from the official and mass discourses, the elite discourse is more politic. They offer sharp criticisms of external provocations and the inefficiency of some countries in dealing with the pandemic and publicise cooperative intentions around the world. The pro-conciliatory nature of the official discourse, the pro-confrontational nature of the mass discourse and the “neutral” nature of the elite discourse have been proved quantitatively and qualitatively. Second, the heterogeneity suggests that the masses and the Chinese government subscribe to different nationalist frames that run parallel to each other to some extent. The weak correlations in quantitative and qualitative analyses demonstrate this point. Third, the masses lead Chinese nationalism from the front during the pandemic, which also challenges the prevalent view that it is the CCP that frames public opinion on such issues.

However, these finding are only a product of a particular period. Thus, it is uncertain whether the masses' radical role in nationalism is a temporary phenomenon as a result of the pandemic or a long-standing product of past interventions by the state and whether the masses are still the most vociferous advocates of nationalism in the future. In addition, although this article gives an initial attempt to study Chinese nationalism follows a trichotomy, the boundary between these three groups is not well-defined. For instance, it is difficult to decide whether some social elites in China should be regarded as part of the “intermediary,” the “top” or the “bottom” public (Shen, 2007:32). In this regard, how to better define and exmine subgroups in China worth further exploration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article was first presented at Asia Research Institute, NUS and the ISA2021 Annual Convention. I would like to show my gratitude to Guo Binglian, Joana Cheong Mesquita Ferreira and Zhai Zheng for sharing their pearls of wisdom with me during the course of this research, and I thank the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments. Special thanks to the encouragement from Professor Ted Hopf and Professor Shaun Breslin.

ENDNOTES

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